Another Country by Sykes, OJ & Desjardins, X
The implications and eventual form of so-called 
UK ‘Brexit’ from the EU continue to dominate the
political agenda and the headlines. Yet as inflation
climbs1 and the UK falls to the bottom of the
economic growth tables in the EU and G7,2 there 
is still precious little for those in planning and 
related fields to go on when appraising the 
potential impacts on their work of an ongoing 
period of uncertainty unprecedented in recent
British history.
With so much still up in the air, it is little wonder
that many working in planning and related
disciplines seem to be hunkering down and trying
to get on with their day jobs – or perhaps for many
in the public sector that should read ‘get on with
their day job as best they can, given the scale of
cuts to local budgets and teams over recent years’?
On the legislative and policy front the continuing
lack of specification of what kind of relationship the
UK will have in future with the EU also means that
12 months after the EU referendum there is still
little clarity. Actors across a range of fields in
planning, development and environmental policy 
are therefore still very much reading the runes in
terms of the implications for their sectors.3
Being a professional in ‘Brexit Britain’ requires
further attention to sustain professional values and
integrity, and vigilance around the potential of being
drawn into apologism for, abnegation in the face of,
or collaboration with political agendas that grate
with planning’s progressive vocation.4
Given the picture sketched above – partly in
weariness(!), but also in a spirit of overcoming 
the solipsism and insularity that contributed to
getting the UK into its present predicament – this
instalment of ‘Europe Inside Out’ turns its attention
to developments elsewhere in Britain’s home
continent.
More specifically, it considers some of the
potential consequences for territorial and planning
issues of the recent elections in France.
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The place of ‘the urban’ in the 2017 French
presidential campaign
The French presidential campaign of spring 2017
was not marked by a strong emphasis on ‘the city’,
or urban futures. This seems to have been for a
number of reasons.
First, as a presidential election it was largely
fought around overarching political principles and
orientations, with a focus on the national level and
the wider ‘future of France’.5 It is interesting that in
the EU referendum debate in 2016 in the UK the
diverse territorial interests of places similarly did 
not really focus much in a debate quite myopically
focused on a notional and monolithic ‘national
interest’. In the French presidential election the four
most popular candidates, François Fillon, Emmanuel
Macron, Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon,
were mostly distinguished by their stances on quite
a limited range of key issues, such as their position
on the EU and the cultural diversity of the country.
Although for planners and others in related disciplines
many of these issues may have self-evident spatial
dimensions, in the campaign territorial and urban
questions were less central in the positioning of the
candidates than the wider issues.
Secondly, the disciplinary backgrounds of the
candidates, who mainly had a legal, administrative
and economic background and culture, also played 
a role. None had a background in any of the spatial
disciplines, or had been particularly invested
previously in planning issues – either as an elected
representative or an activist.
Thirdly, journalists tended to call on academics
and commentators with a background in economics
to discuss policy issues during the campaign. This
contributed to raising the prominence of economic
concerns, although these were clearly central
anyway, given issues such as the stubbornly high
levels of employment which had marked the
quinquennium of the outgoing president, François
Hollande.
Different ways of being territorial
On a wider front, however, the campaign was
marked by a discussion of territorial issues.5 For
example, all the candidates talked about rural and
peri-urban spaces. France’s character as a relatively
low-density country partly explains this, as in such a
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setting the question of the countryside and rural
areas is ever present in the national conversation. 
In historical terms the notion of the territory of the
nation and the interrelation and integration of its
constituent parts has been prominent since at least
the 1940s, which saw the publication of Jean-
François Gravier’s Paris et le désert français, and it
was later officially and linguistically enshrined in the
concept and policy of aménagement du territoire. 
A major historical work edited by Pierre Nora in the
1990s6 on the places and artefacts of the French
national consciousness evokes territorial
perspectives – of ‘Paris-province’, ‘Centre and
periphery’, ‘North-South’, and ‘the soil’.
In short, the problematisation of links between
cities and the countryside is a classic figure of
French political rhetoric; perhaps even a ‘French
passion’, according to the geographer Philippe
Estèbe.7 Yet despite the shared concern for this
issue, the positions of the candidates in the
presidential election were far from identical, even 
if they all expressed the same solicitude towards
less-dense territories.
Marine Le Pen proposed to regroup spatial
planning, transport and housing in a single ministry
and ‘to rebalance the politique de la ville (urban
policy) towards desertified8 and rural areas’. In
essence she was taking up the position and
analysis which schematically contrasts ‘peripheral
France’ with a ‘France of metropolises’, and sees a
‘France of the countryside and peri-urban zones’
marked by socio-economic decline and a withdrawal
of public services. This binary reading of the
territory has been contradicted by geographers who
have clearly shown the diversity of development
trajectories in metropolises as well as in small
towns and the countryside.
However, Marine Le Pen drew on the ‘peripheral
France’ discourse to question the politique de la ville
– the policy in favour of working-class neighbourhoods
in large cities.9 This policy was presented by Le Pen
as soaking up public funds to the detriment of rural
and peri-urban areas. This cultivation of a sense of
grievance against other places and groups – for
example ‘left-behind’ places versus the big cities
(London/Washington, etc.); ‘hard-done-to natives’
versus ‘immigrants’ – echoed similar tropes
deployed by recent populist movements in the 
US and UK.
This discourse also implied criticism of the
expense of place-based public policies pursued to
support deprived neighbourhoods – where many
ethnic minorities and immigrants live – which, it 
was alleged, are undertaken to the detriment of the
needs of the ‘indigenous’ population living in the
countryside and suburban areas. Here again there
were strong echoes of recent populist claims
elsewhere – for example those heard during the
UK’s 2016 EU referendum and its aftermath, to the
effect that immigrants were taking housing and job
opportunities from ‘locals’.
In short, even if it had changed its language and
sought to cultivate a more mainstream image, the
Front National remained a party of the extreme right,
something that could be discerned from a reading of
its stance on territorial policies during the election.
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Reforms of territorial governance – no
permanent French revolution?
In a country with over 36,000 local communes it
is perhaps unsurprising that the re-grouping of local
government areas has been a permanent subject of
debate and action over recent decades. Initiatives to
foster consolidation were particularly marked in the
1990s, with a concerted effort at the turn of the
century.
The recent NOTRe law of 201510 has profoundly
affected inter-municipal groupings. Their minimum
size has been reduced to 15,000 inhabitants, other
than in exceptional cases. According to data from
the Directorate General of Local Authorities of the
Ministry of the Interior, France had 1,266 public
inter-municipal co-operation bodies on 1 January
2017, compared with 2,061 a year earlier.
With such developments, is it possible that the
country is reaching a kind of tipping point in its local
territorial governance arrangements? Perhaps. But
the speeches of the candidates in the presidential
election often stressed the enduring importance of
the communal level, not least perhaps because any
candidate had to obtain the sponsorship of 500 local
mayors to run in the election! After the recent
significant cycle of reforms11 most elected officials
and local authority officers also feel that a pause in
‘quasi-permanent’ territorial reform is needed.
As a result, most candidates for the presidency
did not propose radical changes, with François Fillon
of the Republicains, for example, clearly stating that
he did not wish to undertake a new territorial
reform. The most ‘Jacobin’12 candidates expressed
the strongest attachment to the commune. This was
particularly so for Marine Le Pen, and to a lesser
extent for Jean-Luc Mélenchon. According to this
political tradition, the ‘multiplication’ of the places/
sites of power favoured by the inter-municipal
groupings is experienced as a form of betrayal of
popular sovereignty. The latter, it is argued, should
be expressed in one place, through one person, and
in one assembly. It is argued that the ‘people’ and
their ‘will’ are one and indivisible, and so cannot be
represented in a multitude of different places. The
scales of belonging and legitimate representation
for the ‘Jacobins’ are typically viewed as being the
‘traditional’ local (communal) and national levels.
On the related issue of the relations between the
state and sub-state territorial authorities, the latest
presidential campaign was distinguished from its
recent predecessors by the absence of proposals
for further decentralisation. Only Emmanuel Macron
asserted that he was a ‘Girondin’.13 There are some
important contextual factors to bear in mind here –
notably that the ‘regionalisms’ which have for many
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years pushed for new waves of decentralisation 
are currently in fairly sharp retreat. In addition, 
some argue that many of the expectations of
decentralisation in terms of local democracy and 
the effectiveness of public management have not
necessarily been realised.
There were also other contextual political factors
which played a role. Shifting power and competences
up and down the scales of ‘multi-level governance’
was not a popular option among the majority of
candidates. If decentralisation was not the order of
the day, then neither was enhanced supra-nationalism,
with only Emmanuel Macron and Benoit Hamon
(the Partie Socialiste candidate) being in favour of
further boosting the EU’s problem-solving capacity.
For most candidates in the presidential election, the
nation state and local scales were the key, as seen
either from a ‘top-down’ statist angle or from a
bottom-up perspective of viewing local territories as
the spatial expression of representation and identity
and the building blocks of an indivisible people and
national state territory.
The 2017 French presidential election – winning
from the centre
The first round of voting in the French presidential
election was marked by strong representation of
different political positions, with the candidates from
the leftist France Insoumise party, the far right Front
National, centre right Les Republicains and Macron’s
centrist En Marche movement each attracting
around 20% of the votes cast. Macron came first
(24.01%), with Marine Le Pen in second place
(21.3%), and they therefore both progressed to the
second round of voting. In the latter Macron won
convincingly with 66% of the votes cast, exceeding
pre-election and exit poll predictions.
In June 2017 his new party, La République en
Marche (LReM), also secured a majority in the
parliamentary elections with its allies the centrist
MoDem party – although on a very low overall
turnout (perhaps a result of election fatigue and the
decision since 2002 to hold parliamentary elections
so close to the presidential elections to give new
presidents a strong mandate for action). At the
election LReM fielded 50% female and 50% male
candidates, many of whom were political novices,
and the new parliament has seen an unprecedented
turnover in representatives, with 75% of MPs being
new to the ‘hemicycle’ (the nickname for the
chamber of the National Assembly).14
Another change was the end, following a new law
passed in 2012, of the so-called ‘cumul des mandats’
(the holding of multiple elected offices). Since the
beginning of the Fifth Republic, most of the deputies
europe inside out
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in the National Assembly have also been mayors of
local communes, and this ended with the election
of the 2017 parliament. Many of the LReM deputies,
in contrast, had never even been mayors before.
This represented both a significant and rather subtle
change in the composition of parliament, which has
become a more genuinely ‘National Assembly’ than
an assembly of local mayors, or presidents of
departmental councils.
Macron’s success has been widely seen
internationally and in the wake of reversals for
populist parties in other European countries such 
as Austria, the Netherlands, Italy and Finland as
marking a breaking of the populist wave of 2016
which delivered so-called ‘Brexit’ in the UK and the
Trump presidency in the US. What has happened in
France has led to a resurgence of optimism and
faith in progressive politics among observers –
notably abroad, where the new president’s early
performance on the international stage on issues
such as climate change has been applauded.
Some, though, have moved rapidly and rather
lazily to pigeonhole Macron as the ex-banker likely
to be an enthusiastic neoliberaliser and nothing
more. Others, such as UK commentator Will Hutton,
have pointed out that Macron’s plans to ‘refashion’
the state’s ‘priorities around public spending at
around 50% of GDP, together with labour market
regulation and open trading policies that emulate
the Nordics’ might be compared with the UK Labour
Party’s recent ‘socialist manifesto’, which ‘would lift
Britain’s public spending to just over 40% of GDP …
with tax rates still lower than in France’.15 To adapt
LP Hartley’s famous phrase, it seems that ‘France is
a foreign country: they do things differently there’!
But even as the Republic endures and rejuvenates,
the challenges Macron faces are significant. Although
the vote for the Front National collapsed in the
parliamentary elections in June compared with the
presidential election in May,16 there are still
territorial differences in voting patterns and
significant challenges for the new president.
It was notable that during his victory rally – at
which he emerged from the precincts of the Louvre
Palace to the strains of Beethoven and Schiller’s 
An die Freude/Ode to Joy – he sought to heal rifts
in French society. He quickly and firmly asked a
small minority of his supporters who had booed a
mention in his speech of the Front National’s voters
to recognise that the goal was reconciliation and
making sure that such voters would never in future
feel disenfranchised enough to heed the hollow
clarion calls of populism. Here was a president
elected by the 66% pledging not to forget and
forsake the 34%.
Territorial policy under the Macron presidency –
early days, but what might we expect?
Early indications are that the Macron presidency
will focus its urban and territorial policy around three
key themes:
● a shift from pursuing the equality of territories to
the cohesion of territories;
● a continuation in support for neighbourhood
regeneration and renewal; and
● a maintained commitment to addressing climate
change at home and abroad.
From the equality of territories to the cohesion
of territories?
Following the presidential election, the ministry
responsible for territorial affairs had its name changed
from the Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire,
de la Ruralité et des Collectivités Territoriales (2016-
2017) (Ministry for Aménagement du Territoire,
Rurality and Territorial Authorities) to the Ministère
de la Cohésion des Territoires (Ministry for the
Cohesion of Territories). The notion of equality of
territories had led to policies which focused on
addressing rural and urban imbalances, or relations
between métropoles and non-metropolitan
territories.
The adoption of the term ‘cohésion’ implies two
principal things. First, it represents an evolution
from a ‘binary’ reading of territories and territorial
challenges (for example rural areas and lives are ‘like
this’, urban areas and lives are ‘like that’) to a more
‘systemic’ reading which considers and seeks to
address the realities of citizens’ lives within their
territories rather than identifying specific territorial
weaknesses and problems. The new language also
represents an alignment with the terminology used
at European level in discussions and policies aimed
at strengthening territorial cohesion. In a sense this
may appear unsurprising from a president who
strongly identified with European co-operation and
partnership throughout his campaign.
It may also represent an evolution towards more
endogenously considered approaches to territorial
development (in which public action seeks to aid
places in making the most of their intrinsic attributes
to develop themselves), rather than a more traditional
approach that seeks to foster territorial balance
(typically through a redistributive regional policy
which may make significant transfers from more
prosperous to less prosperous areas).
These changes are perhaps not that new, but
stand in a line of continuity which has seen the 
role, instruments and scales of aménagement du
territoire change since its inception in the post-war
years – notably in response to the economic crisis of
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the 1970s, decentralisation, economic restructuring,
and changing views about the centrality of public
action in societal and economic affairs.
A continuation in support for neighbourhood
regeneration and renewal
The policy in relation to neighbourhood renewal
and regeneration seems set to be marked by
continuity. The national ‘programme de rénovation
urbaine’, which addresses the issues of deprived
neighbourhoods frequently found in the suburbs of
the cities, will continue, and it has recently been
announced that its budget could be doubled to
10 billion euros. However, the level of funding for
local authorities in general is still being debated,
with the government stating it wishes to see a
decline in this.17 Action to address issues of
educational attainment will also be pursued, with
proposals to limit class sizes to 12 pupils per class
at CP and CE1 level (years 1 and 2 in England – i.e.
5-7 year olds) in the zones d’éducation prioritaire
(education priority zones). But in general it seems
that the forms and instruments of la politique de 
la ville (the national urban policy addressing social
issues facing more deprived areas) will not be
reformed and that continuity will be the main
theme. This in itself is significant given that during
the elections a part of the mainstream right and 
Le Pen of the far right had wanted to abolish this
policy.
Finally, it is worth noting that while none of the
candidates for the presidency had been particularly
involved in planning and urban issues, the new
French prime minister, the centre right Edouard
Philippe, was previously mayor of Le Havre, where
he coveted the planning brief and apparently
demonstrated a keen interest in the UNESCO listed
architecture of the city, which was re-planned after
the Second World War by Auguste Perret.18
Make the planet great again! A maintained
commitment to addressing climate change
Perhaps Macron’s most visible action on the
international stage to date has been his swift
response to Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw
the US from the agreement made at the ‘COP 21’
UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015.
Within a matter of days the new French president
had launched an appeal to experts and citizens to
come to France and work on climate change
science and societal responses of mitigation and
adaptation. This initiative – which cheekily stole 
the syntactical clothes of Trump’s mantra ‘Make
America great again’ – was presented under the
slogan ‘Make our planet great again’.19
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France is a relatively ‘bon élève’ (good student)
when it comes to its comparative position in GDP
rankings as compared with its greenhouse gas
emissions. But as ever this reflects a complex
reality – not least the country’s heavy dependence
on nuclear energy, and also its endowment with
relatively abundant geographical opportunities and
facilities for the exploitation of ‘first generation’
renewable sources (notably ‘la houille blanche’ –
hydropower).
Macron’s position on the nuclear industry has
vacillated, and he has some hard decisions to make
about the future of some of France’s older nuclear
facilities, which are approaching the end of their
useful (and some claim safely extendable) operating
lives. The new prime minister not only has past
experience of urban issues and planning but also
previously worked for the French nuclear industry –
a fact which has not gone unnoticed on the green
and left wings of French politics.
Elsewhere on the domestic front the Ministry of
Environment has been renamed the Ministry of
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Ecological Transition, with Nicolas Hulot, a popular
environmental campaigner and TV presenter, as its
new minister. With the continued commitment to
the outcomes of ‘COP 21’, this appointment –
alongside the international activity mentioned above
– is a clear sign that there is sustained momentum
for addressing climate change. This can build on a
base of the many national schemes for biodiversity,
renewable energy and the circular economy promoted
during the past decade. In the 1990s, ‘sustainable
development’ as a paradigm profoundly modified
the instruments and daily activities of planning. In
the next decade, the new ‘transition path’ being
plotted could similarly become one of the most
important elements transforming administrative and
technical planning bodies in France.
Conclusion
Clifford Harper’s haunting new thumbnail sketch
for ‘Europe Inside Out’ at the head of this piece
conveys a sense of gazing across the Channel
beyond the confines of Britain’s island shores. In
this spirit, this article has considered recent political
developments in our nearest continental neighbour,
France, in terms of some of their territorial/place-
based implications. It has noted how in the recent
French presidential elections a pause in institutional
reforms of the territorial organisation of the Republic
following the legislative activism of recent years
was a rather rare point of consensus between
candidates with otherwise widely differing views.
After the key laws and reforms that punctuated the
2014-15 period and which are still bedding down,
the appetite for future significant reforms was
somewhat suppressed.
Yet the presidential campaign was nevertheless
characterised by more or less explicit visions and
versions of place, space and territory, with contrasts
between the ‘Jacobins’ and ‘sovereignists’, who
generally favoured centralism and privileged the
national and local levels and state (François Fillon of
the centre right Republicains, the leftist Mélenchon
and Le Pen of the far right), and those like the
centrist Macron and socialist Hamon with more
‘Girondin’, or ‘decentralising’, tendencies.
On a wider front Macron’s victory may well herald
a period of renewed European confidence,20 with
implications for EU activism in fields such as cohesion
and environmental policy; and – to return briefly to
the UK’s current situation – he has also explicitly
extended the hand of friendship to Britain, emphasising
that the door for continued membership of the EU is
‘still open’.21 Internationally he has made an early bid
to set the agenda for continued global co-operation
and action to address climate change.
The new president has started his term at a
blistering pace with a clear sense of purpose. But 
it is early days and there are many challenges 
ahead which Macron himself repeatedly described
as ‘immense’ during his victory speech. Many of
these have a strong spatial and territorial dimension,
notably around economic and social issues. While
there are signs of continuity as well as change on
territorial matters, it already seems clear that the
instruments and practitioners of planning will have
their role to play if Macron’s vision of a renewed
France is to be realised.
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